Andreina Thoma
Last Name
Thoma
First name
Andreina
Email
andreina.thoma@unisg.ch
11 results
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Item type:Publication, Municipality-Level Outcomes of Direct-Democratic Votes in Switzerland, 1866-2023.(John Wiley & Sons (United Kingdom), 2025-03); ; Switzerland relies heavily on direct-democratic institutions to decide on a wide range of political issues. Since 1848, more than 600 direct-democratic votes have taken place at the national level. However, the lack of comprehensive data has limited the systematic use of these votes for research. This paper introduces a new dataset containing municipality-level outcomes for all direct-democratic votes from 1866 to 1944, and supplements post-1945 data to fill gaps in previous collections. Spanning over 150 years, the new dataset contains more than 1.3 million observations. Several empirical illustrations demonstrate the dataset's potential for research.Type:journal articleJournal:Swiss Political Science ReviewVolume:31Issue:1Scopus© Citations 1 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Landholding Inequality, Social Control, and Mass Opposition to Suffrage Extension(2024-04); ; Does landholding inequality undermine democratization? Recent contributions have challenged the argument that landholding elites oppose suffrage extension if geographically fixed assets are unequally distributed. We advance research on this long-standing question by exploiting exogenous variance to reinvestigate the relationship. Using multiple instruments, we find that landholding inequality decreases support for suffrage extension. By focusing on traditional patterns of social control, we explore an empirically neglected mechanism linking landholding inequality and democratization. Taking advantage of four direct democratic votes between 1866 and 1877 in Switzerland, we demonstrate that landholding inequality also influences the political preferences of ordinary citizens who do not control these resources. This paper shows that high levels of landholding inequality provide local elites with the incentive and the means to align the local population's voting behaviour with their political goals. Supplementary analyses using qualitative and quantitative data further substantiate this social control mechanism.Type:journal articleJournal:British Journal of Political ScienceVolume:54Issue:2Scopus© Citations 5 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
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