Moritz Otto Nafeh Dalheimer
Last Name
Dalheimer
First name
Moritz Otto Nafeh
Email
moritzottonafeh.dalheimer@unisg.ch
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Item type:Publication, When Decentralization Helps—and Hurts: Governance Domains and the Distribution of Decision RightsDecentralized platforms use protocol rules and token-weighted voting instead of managerial hierarchy, but we still know little about when decentralization changes governance outcomes. We argue that the effect of decentralization depends on the governance domain. We analyze 3,202 governance proposals (July 2020–October 2025) from 10 token-governed decentralized exchange protocols on Snapshot and merge them with protocol-level ownership concentration in voting power (Gini) from Boardroom. Using unsupervised topic modeling of proposal text, we classify proposals into governance domains and relate ownership concentration to proposal-level weighted consensus. Ownership concentration is associated with higher consensus for proposals that dele-gate exceptional control rights and for proposals that allocate shared resources. Ownership concentration is associated with lower consensus for proposals that distribute broad-based participation incentives. These results show that decentralization is not a single governance prescription: its relationship with consensus differs systematically across governance domains.Type:conference paperJournal:Academy of Management ProceedingsVolume:2026Issue:1 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
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Item type:Publication, Decentralization and Platform Usage: Evidence from Decentralized Exchange Platforms(2025-07-29); Digital platforms are often governed by a centralized organization that acts as the orchestrators and has significant power over complementors or users, which creates the risk that this power may be misused. An alternative governance model are decentralized platforms, where the orchestrator consists of a decentralized organization where ownership and decision-making are distributed among multiple actors. In this paper, we study how a decrease in trust in centralized platforms affects the extent to which users transact on these two types of platforms. Using the collapse of a centralized platform for digital currency exchange as an exogenous shock, we find that users in-creasingly transact on decentralized platforms as a reaction to an erosion of trust in centralized platforms. The magnitude of this effect varies depending on whether long-term relationships with the platform have been established in the past. Our findings contribute to the literature on platform governance by shedding light on how different types of orchestrator governance can affect platform usage.Type:conference paperVolume:2025Issue:1 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Decentralization and Platform Usage: Evidence from Decentralized Exchange Platforms(2024); Digital platforms have gained significant prominence in recent years. Often, the orchestra-tors of such platforms are centralized organizations that have significant power over com-plementors and users, which creates the risk that this power may be misused. In this paper, we study decentralization, an alternative platform governance model that might mitigate such risks by reducing the concentration of power, and analyze whether decentralization is valued by users. Specifically, using the collapse of a centralized platform for digital currency exchange as an exogenous shock, we study if increased awareness of centralization-related risks can positively affect the usage of decentralized platforms. Preliminary evidence sug-gests that users value decentralization per se, while the exact degree of decentralization may be less relevant in driving usage.Type:conference paperJournal:Strategic Management Society Annual Conference