Wei Lin
Title
Dr.
Last Name
Lin
First name
Wei
Email
wei.lin@unisg.ch
Phone
+41 71 224 7027
2 results
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Item type:Publication, Regional Heads at the Top: An Unexplored Microfoundational Factor for Inter-regional Growth in Multinational Enterprises(2026); Most of the world’s multinational enterprises (MNEs) concentrate their economic activities mainly in their home regional area – the so-called regionalization phenomenon. This phenomenon has been regarded as a cause of inter-regional economic fragmentation, and an impediment to global integration in an era of high geopolitical uncertainty. This has led scholars to stress the need for examining the factors that enable MNEs to move away from their regionalization tendencies and realize growth across regions. We inform this area of research via a microfoundational lens. Integrating the Microfoundational View of International Business (MVIB) with the Penrosean Theory of Growth, we argue that a largely neglected yet important microfoundational factor associated with structural capability and administrative efficiency – i.e., the presence of regional heads in the MNE’s top management team (TMT) – enables the MNE’s top managers to economize on the bounded rationality and bounded reliability challenges of operating across regions, and thus boosts growth in these regions. We also postulate that this effect varies with the attributes of the CEO and the characteristics of the region. We test our framework using data from the global automotive industry between 2008 and 2018. Theoretical contributions, practical implications and future research directions are discussed.Type:conference contribution - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Compensation Regulations in Large Banks: Promoting or Preventing the Next Crisis?(2026); ; A series of banking crises in recent years have rekindled the debate across the globe on regulating executive pay and especially on the effects of “excessive” executive compensation. This paper reviews the executive pay regulations currently in place in advanced economies with strong financial sectors. We look at the nature of the regime (regulation or principles), the target group (e.g., the Top Management Team, Material Risk Takers or the entire bank) and variable pay regulations concerning bonus cap, deferrals, and malus or clawback provisions. We find that regulations among major developed economies have neither been completed nor harmonised. Moreover, the literature explicitly studying the effects of executive compensation in banks and financial services on growth, innovation and risks is limited, and there is mixed evidence on the effectiveness of existing regulations. We find that although European countries have enforced stricter regulation, U.S. studies are dominating the literature. We conclude that policymakers are lacking strong empirical foundations to opt for relaxing or increasing executive pay regulation. We discuss the implications and identify research directions to support future policymaking.Type:conference contribution