Marc Arnold
Title
Prof. Dr.
Last Name
Arnold
First name
Marc
Email
marc.arnold@unisg.ch
ORCID
Phone
+41 71 224 7413
17 results
Now showing 1 - 10 of 17
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Item type:Publication, Pricing, issuance volume, and design of innovative securities: The role of investor informationThis study investigates the role of asymmetric information for the pricing, issuance volume, and design of innovative securities. By analyzing the information that structured product issuers provide to the investors of those products, we can identify specific sources of asymmetric information between the issuers and investors in this market. We show that issuers exploit this information friction to offer products to investors that appear more profitable for the issuer. In addition, we find that the friction induces issuers to design products with higher information asymmetry. Our results suggest that product issuers’ behavior increases information frictions in the financial system.Type:journal articleJournal:Journal of Financial IntermediationVolume:55Scopus© Citations 3 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Attention Triggers and Investors' Risk Taking(2022-02); Scopus© Citations 29 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Debt Renegotiations Outside DistressThis paper develops a model to explore the implications of non-distressed debt renegotiation on debt prices and corporate policies. The model incorporates the empirical observation that creditors can influence firms also outside corporate distress through debt covenant renegotiation and not only in distress. We find that considering both distressed and non-distressed creditor interventions is key to investigating how creditor governance affects firms. The model explains cross-sectional patterns of control premiums and credit spreads that traditional debt renegotiation models do not capture. We also derive novel implications for the impact of firm characteristics associated with renegotiation on debt prices and corporate policies.Type:journal articleJournal:Review of FinanceIssue:2015/14Scopus© Citations 1 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Neglected Risk in Financial Innovation: Evidence from Structured Product Counterparty ExposureWe investigate the compensation of counterparty exposure in the prices of structured products. Our analysis reveals that product issuers did not compensate retail investors for counterparty exposure before the Lehman default. Post‐Lehman, retail prices have no longer neglected this risk. We also measure retail investor attention towards issuer credit risk. For a given level of issuer credit risk, counterparty exposure is compensated more when attention is higher. Furthermore, issuers tend to construct products with larger counterparty exposure. Overall, our results shed light on the conditions under which financial engineering generates neglected risk.Type:journal articleJournal:European Financial ManagementVolume:27Issue:2 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Financing Asset Sales and Business CyclesUsing a dynamic model of financing, investment, and macroeconomic risk, we investigate when firms sell assets to fund investments (financing asset sales) across the business cycle. Equity financed investment transfers wealth from equity to debt because asset volatility declines and earnings increase when firms invest. Financing asset sales reduce asset collateral and, hence, transfer wealth back from debt to equity. Exploring the dynamics of the heretofore overlooked “asset sale versus external equity” financing margin across business cycles helps explain novel stylized facts about asset sales and their business cycle patterns that cannot be rationalized by traditional motives for selling assets.Type:journal articleJournal:Review of FinanceVolume:22Issue:1Scopus© Citations 31 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, The Impact of Central Clearing on Banks' Lending DisciplineIn this paper, I investigate the impact of central clearing in credit risk transfer markets on a loan-originating bank's lending behavior. Under the current market regulation, central clearing undermines banks’ lending discipline. The regulatory design of the credit risk transfer market in terms of capital requirements, disclosure standards, risk retention, and access to uncleared credit risk transfer can mitigate this problem. I also show that the lending discipline channel is an essential element of the impact of central clearing on banks’ loan default loss exposure, which is a first-order consideration for systemic risk analysis.Type:journal articleJournal:Journal of Financial MarketsVolume:36 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Managerial Cash Use, Default, and Corporate Financial PoliciesThis article investigates the impact of the observation that managers can use cash to defer bankruptcy on default risk and corporate financial policies. I show that with managerial cash use to defer default, the impact of cash on default risk depends on two opposing channels. While cash provides managers with a buffer against bankruptcy during difficult times, it also reduces equityholders' willingness to contribute funds to the firm, which increases bankruptcy risk. The total impact of cash on default risk is driven by firm and industry characteristics that affect the relative importance of these two channels. As managers' propensity for excess cash holdings depends on this total impact, the model explains observed excess cash levels, their determinants, and a wide range of empirical regularities of corporate cash holdings properties.Type:journal articleJournal:Journal of Corporate FinanceIssue:27Scopus© Citations 37 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Growth Options, Macroeconomic Conditions and the Cross-Section of Credit RiskThis paper develops a structural equilibrium model with intertemporal macroeconomic risk, incorporating the fact that firms are heterogeneous in their asset composition. Compared to firms that are mainly composed of invested assets, firms with growth options have higher costs of debt because they are more volatile and have a greater tendency to default during recession when marginal utility is high and recovery rates are low. Our model matches empirical facts regarding credit spreads, default probabilities, leverage ratios, equity premiums, and investment clustering. Importantly, it also makes predictions about the cross-section of all these features.Type:journal articleJournal:Journal of Financial EconomicsVolume:107Issue:2Scopus© Citations 45 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Credit Control Rights and the Pricing of Private Loans(2025); ; This paper investigates the influence of creditor control rights on the pricing of corporate loans. We construct a novel dataset, which combines hand-collected covenant violations data with individual borrower, creditor, and loan contract information.Type:conference paper - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Creditor Control Rights and the Pricing of Private Loans(2023); ; This paper investigates the influence of creditor control rights on the pricing of corporate loans. We construct a novel dataset, which combines hand-collected covenant violations data with individual borrower, creditor, and loan contract information.Type:conference paper