Angelo Ranaldo
Title
Prof. Dr.
Last Name
Ranaldo
First name
Angelo
Phone
+41 71 224 7010
RePec
http://ideas.repec.org/e/pra161.html
SSRN
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=253421
26 results
Now showing 1 - 10 of 26
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Item type:Publication, On The Quality Of Cryptocurrency Markets: Centralized Versus Decentralized ExchangesWe analyze the market quality of centralized crypto exchanges (CEXs) and decentralized blockchain-based venues (DEXs) using a unique and comprehensive dataset. Focusing on two fundamental aspects, transaction costs and deviations from the no-arbitrage condition, we estimate the causal effect of "gas fees" on DEX market quality. We show that these fixed costs impose a significant burden on relatively small trades and cause persistent arbitrage deviations. Conversely, DEXs offer more competitive transaction costs for larger trades, offering a more favorable environment for institutional investors. Furthermore, we provide causal evidence that innovations aimed at enhancing the flexibility of liquidity provision in DEX markets lead to sizeable improvements in market quality.Type:working paperJournal:SSRN Electronic Journal - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, NFT Bubbles(2023-03-10); By investigating nonfungible tokens (NFTs), we provide the first systematic study of retail investor behavior through asset bubbles. Given that NFTs are recorded in public blockchains, we are able to track investor behavior over time, leading to the identification of numerous price run-ups and crashes. Our study reveals that agent-level variables, such as investor sophistication, heterogeneity, and wash trading, in addition to aggregate variables, such as volatility, price acceleration, and turnover, significantly predict bubble formation and price crashes. We find that sophisticated investors consistently outperform others and exhibit characteristics consistent with superior information and skills, supporting the narrative surrounding asset pricing bubbles.Type:working paper - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, NFT Bubbles(2023-03); By investigating nonfungible tokens (NFTs), we provide the first systematic study of retail investor behavior through asset bubbles. Given that NFTs are recorded in public blockchains, we are able to track investor behavior over time, leading to the identification of numerous price run-ups and crashes. Our study reveals that agent-level variables, such as investor sophistication, heterogeneity, and wash trading, in addition to aggregate variables, such as volatility, price acceleration, and turnover, significantly predict bubble formation and price crashes. We find that sophisticated investors consistently outperform others and exhibit characteristics consistent with superior information and skills, supporting the narrative surrounding asset pricing bubbles.Type:working paper - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Collateral CyclesUsing supervisory data from UK clearinghouses (CCPs), we document the presence of a collateral cycle in which cash goes back and forth from financial markets to CCPs. In the onward phase, clearing members provide cash to CCPs to meet margin requirements. This pattern is procyclical as the pledged collateral increases with market volatility and puts upward pressure on repurchase agreement (repo) rates. In the backward phase, CCPs return the cash to the financial markets via reverse repos and bond purchases, in compliance with regulation that requires them to collateralise their cash holdings. The cash given back by CCPs generates downward pressure on repo rates in a counter-cyclical manner.Type:working paperVolume:2023 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
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Item type:Publication, Realized IlliquidityWe study the theoretical and empirical properties of a simple measure of market illiquidity, namely the realized Amihud, which is defined as the ratio between the realized volatility and trading volume and which refines the popular price impact measure proposed by Amihud (2002). In our model, both price volatility and market liquidity are assumed to follow stochastic processes in continuous time. In this setting, characterized by stochastic volatility and liquidity, we prove that the realized Amihud provides a precise measurement of the inverse of integrated liquidity over fixed-length periods (e.g., a day, a week, a month). We consider a number of alternative econometric specifications, hence highlighting the main dynamic and distributional properties of the realized Amihud, including jumps, clustering, and leverage effects.Type:working paper - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Quantitative Easing and the Safe Asset Illusion(SoF HSG, 2021-06-09); ; Ventula Veghazy, AlexiaThe massive recourse to quantitative easing (QE) calls for a better understanding of its effects on safe assets. Based on a simple balance sheet framework, we show how QE impacts the total amount, cross-sectional distribution, and composition of safe assets in the economy. Analyzing the ECB's Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP), we find that the amount of universally accessible safe assets decreases and there is a transfer of safe assets from the non-bank to the banking sector. We call this phenomenon the safe asset illusion. The sectoral shift in the holding structure of safe assets has important implications for financial stability and the cost of secured liquidity.Type:working paperVolume:2021Issue:10 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Constrained Dealers and Market EfficiencyWe analyse how constraints on dealers’ risk bearing capacity affect market efficiency in the foreign exchange (FX) market. Dealers support market efficiency by accommodating their customers’ trading demands through elastic liquidity provision in normal times but when they face constraints their elasticity of liquidity provision weakens. Episodes of tight dealer constraints – for instance, due to high leverage, Value-at-Risk, and funding costs – in turn go hand in hand with price inefficiencies due to law of one price deviations and elevated trading costs. We rationalise our novel empirical findings with a tractable model that sheds light on the key mechanisms of how market efficiency can deteriorate when dealers are more constrained.Type:working paperVolume:2021Issue:16 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Money Market DisconnectA repurchase agreement (repo) is a source of funding and collateral. We document that the money market is more segmented when the collateral motive prevails. Two crucial aspects of the central bank framework lead to this disconnect: banks' access to the central bank's deposit facility and assets' eligibility for Quantitative Easing (QE). We show that repo rates lent by banks with access to the deposit facility and secured by QE eligible assets are more collateral-driven and disconnected from funding-based money market rates. Our results are relevant for different monetary policies and have suggestive implications for the monetary policy pass-through.Type:working paperVolume:2020Issue:03 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Does Quantitative Easing mitigate the Sovereign-Bank Nexus?The credit risk of the sovereign affects the financial health of its banking sector and vice versa, creating an adverse feedback loop known as "sovereign-bank nexus". We show that Quantitative Easing can effectively mitigate the sovereign-bank nexus. Our results indicate that the ECB's Public Sector Purchase Programme reduced the co-movement of sovereign and bank credit risk by almost 80%. The mitigation is driven by the euro area periphery and works through three channels: (i) a reduction in government bond holdings of banks, (ii) an increase of government bond prices, and (iii) an increase inexcess liquidity holdings of banks.Type:working paperVolume:2021Issue:01
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