Matthias Weber
Title
Prof. Dr.
Last Name
Weber
First name
Matthias
Email
matthias.weber@unisg.ch
ORCID
Phone
+41 71 224 70 76
10 results
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Item type:Publication, Mostly Sunny: A Forecast of Tomorrow's Power Index Research(2018-09-30) ;Kurz, Sascha ;Maaser, Nicola ;Napel, StefanPower index research has been a very active field in the last decades. Will this continue or are all the important questions solved? We argue that there are still many opportunities to conduct useful research with and on power indices. Positive and normative questions keep calling for theoretical and empirical attention. Technical and technological improvements are likely to boost applicability.Type:journal article - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, The effects of listing authors in alphabetical order: A review of the empirical evidence(2018-07-01)Type:journal articleJournal:Research EvaluationVolume:27Issue:3Scopus© Citations 37 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, An Experimental Study of Bond Market PricingType:journal articleJournal:The Journal of FinanceVolume:73Issue:4Scopus© Citations 19 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, The Non‐Equivalence of Labour Market Taxes: A Real‐Effort ExperimentUnder full rationality, a labour market tax levied on employers and a corresponding income tax levied on employees are equivalent. With boundedly rational agents, this equivalence is no longer obvious. In a real‐effort experiment, we study the effects of these taxes on preferences concerning the size of the public sector, subjective well‐being, labour supply and on‐the‐job performance. Our findings suggest that employer‐side taxes induce preferences for a larger public sector. Subjective well‐being is higher under employer‐side taxes while labour supply is lower, at least at the extensive margin. We discuss three mechanisms that may underlie these results.Type:journal articleJournal:Economic JournalVolume:127Issue:604Scopus© Citations 29 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Thoughts on Voting Power and the Public Good IndexAmong the wide variety of voting power indices, the public good index (PGI) is one of the less well-known ones. Holler (2019) posits hypotheses about why this is the case. In response to these hypotheses, I share a few thoughts about voting power in general and about the popularity of the PGI.Type:journal-articleJournal:Munich Social Science ReviewVolume:3 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Comment on “Does your surname affect the citability of your publications”The question whether the position of a researcher’s last name in the alphabet matters for his or her scientific career is important. Abramo and D’Angelo (2017) attempt to answer this question and claim that they find “no evidence whatsoever that alphabetically earlier surnames gain advantage”. This stands in contrast to almost all literature on the topic (for a recent survey, see Weber, 2016). The reason that the results in Abramo and D’Angelo (2017) differ from the standard results is that the way they conduct their research is problematic and their claims are unsubstantiated.Type:journal-articleJournal:Journal of InformetricsVolume:11Issue:2 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Two-tier voting: Measuring inequality and specifying the inverse power problemThere are many situations in which different groups make collective decisions by committee voting, with each group represented by a single person. This paper is about two closely related problems. The first is that of how to measure the inequality of a voting system in such a setting. The second is the inverse power problem: the problem of finding voting systems that approximate equal indirect voting power as well as possible. I argue that the coefficient of variation is appropriate to measure the inequality of a voting system and to specify the inverse problem. I then show how specifying the inverse problem with the coefficient of variation compares to using existing objective functions.Type:journal-articleJournal:Mathematical Social SciencesVolume:79Scopus© Citations 6 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Die deutsche Schuldenbremse zwingt den Staat, Geld auf der Straße liegen zu lassen(2019-08-19)Type:newspaper articleJournal:Ökonomenstimme - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Für eine regelgebundene monetäre Staatsfinanzierung(2018-06-27)Type:newspaper articleJournal:Ökonomenstimme - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Credit Default Swap Regulation in Experimental Bond Markets(2019-06-21); ;Duffy, JohnSchram, ArthurCredit default swaps (CDS) played an important role in the financial crisis of 2008. While CDS can be used to hedge risks, they can also be used for speculative purposes (as occurred during the financial crisis) and regulations have been proposed to limit such speculative use. Here, we provide the first controlled experiment analyzing the pricing of credit default swaps in a bond market subject to default risk. We further use the laboratory as a testbed to analyze CDS regulation. Our results show that the regulation achieves the goal of increasing the use of CDS for hedging purposes while reducing the use of CDS for speculation. This success does not come at the expense of lower bond IPO revenues and does not negatively affect CDS prices or bond prices in the secondary market.Type:working paperJournal:Working Papers on Finance, No. 2019/05, University of St. Gallen