Samuel Häfner
Last Name
Häfner
First name
Samuel
Email
samuel.haefner@unisg.ch
ORCID
Phone
+41 71 224 2765
16 results
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Item type:Publication, Risk Aversion in Share Auctions: Estimating Import Rents from TRQs in Switzerland(2023)Type:journal articleJournal:Quantitative EconomicsDOI:10.3982/QE1907Scopus© Citations 5 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
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Item type:Publication, Eternal Peace in the Tug-of-War?(2022)The tug-of-war between single players is known to have a non-cooperative Markov-perfect equilibrium in which both players expend zero efforts and neither player drives the Markov process to one of the terminal states. We show that these peaceful outcomes vanish if the single players are replaced by teams with team members permanently assigned to the different Markov states and interacting pairwise in an all-pay auction. The reason for this phenomenon is that the members of the teams can externalize future effort costs while the single players cannot. Our analysis also highlights the impact of the discount factor on the expected trajectory of the tug-of-war, the dynamics of the expected efforts, and the degree of rent dissipation.Type:journal articleJournal:Economic TheoryScopus© Citations 4 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Sorting in Iterated Incumbency ContestsThis paper analyzes incumbency contests in a large population setting. Incumbents repeatedly face different challengers, holding on to their positions until defeated in a contest. Defeated incumbents turn into challengers until they win a contest against an incumbent, thereby regaining an incumbency position. Individuals are heterogeneous as regards their payoffs from being incumbent. We consider steady-state equilibria and study how and to which extent individuals sort into the incumbency positions depending on their type. In particular, we identify sufficient conditions for positive sorting, meaning that types with higher incumbency payoffs are overrepresented among the incumbents, and show that negative rather than positive sorting may also arise in equilibrium when these conditions are violated. Further results show how incumbency rents, surplus and sorting are affected by the frequency at which incumbency is contested.Type:journal articleJournal:Economic TheoryScopus© Citations 3 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, On Young Turks and Yes-Men: Optimal Contracting for AdviceType:journal articleJournal:The RAND Journal of EconomicsScopus© Citations 2 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
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Item type:Publication, Front-Running in Ascending Auctions: The Case for a Random-Close Rule(2026-06-25)Type:conference speech - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Front-Running in Ascending Auctions: The Case for a Random-Close Rule(2026-08-27)Type:conference speech - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
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