The WTO Dispute Settlement System: Playing the Game
Series
Discussion Paper, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen
Type
discussion paper
Date Issued
1998-01-01
Author(s)
Abstract
This paper analyzes the new World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system as a dynamic game under uncertainty, and explores its strategic elements and incentive structure. Our model delivers a number of implications, confirmed by already settled cases: Governments are often tempted to introduce trade restrictions which can guar- antee a positive payoff for a certain period of time. The complainant's agenda{setting capacity, nevertheless, can enhance economic efficiency by limiting the period in which trade restrictions are active. The losing party has a strong incentive to appeal the first instance findings of the procedure. Bilateral settlements can become feasible at different intermediate stages of the process. (pdf, 311k)
Language
English
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
Refereed
No
Number
no. 9801
Start page
1
End page
37
Pages
37
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
16009
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