Guido Cozzi
Title
Prof. PhD
Last Name
Cozzi
First name
Guido
Email
guido.cozzi@unisg.ch
Phone
+41 71 224 2399
RePec
http://ideas.repec.org/f/pco350.html
7 results
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Item type:Publication, Growth accounting and endogenous technical change.This study explores growth accounting under endogenous technological progress. It is well known that the Solow approach overstates (understates) the contribution of capital accumulation (technological progress) to economic growth and that the Mankiw-Romer-Weil approach addresses this issue. However, we find that the Mankiw-Romer-Weil approach is inconsistent (consistent) with the lab-equipment (knowledge-driven) specification for technological progress. We also examine the importance of capital accumulation on growth in China under the two approaches.Type:journal articleJournal:Economics lettersVolume:146Scopus© Citations 7 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Theory and Empirics of Stage-Dependent Intellectual Property RightsInspired by the Chinese experience, we develop a Schumpeterian growth model of distance to frontier in which economic growth in the developing country is driven by domestic innovation as well as imitation and transfer of foreign technologies through foreign direct investment. We show that optimal intellectual property rights (IPR) protection is stagedependent. At an early stage of development, the country implements weak IPR protection to facilitate imitation. At a later stage of development, the country implements strong IPR protection to encourage domestic innovation. Therefore, the growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing levels of patent strength increase as the country evolves towards the world technology frontier, and this dynamic pattern is consistent with the actual evolution of patent strength in China. Furthermore, we use a dynamic panel regression model to provide empirical evidence that supports the key implication of our theoretical model.Type:discussion paperIssue:1306 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, R&D and Economic Growth in a Cash-in-Advance EconomyR&D investment has well-known liquidity problems, with potentially important consequences. In this paper, we analyze the effects of monetary policy on economic growth and social welfare in a Schumpeterian model with cash-in-advance (CIA) constraints on consumption, R&D investment, and manufacturing. Our results are as follows. Under the CIA constraints on consumption and R&D (manufacturing), an increase in the nominal interest rate would decrease (increase) R&D and economic growth. So long as the effect of cash requirements in R&D is relatively more important than in manufacturing, the nominal interest rate would have an overall negative effect on R&D and economic growth as documented in recent empirical studies. We also analyze the optimality of Friedman rule and find that Friedman rule can be suboptimal due to a unique feature of the Schumpeterian model. Specifically, we find that the suboptimality or optimality of Friedman rule is closely related to a seemingly unrelated issue that is the overinvestment versus underinvestment of R&D in the market economy, and this result is robust to alternative versions of the Schumpeterian model.Type:discussion paperIssue:1308 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, A Simple Theory of Offshoring and ReshoringIn this study, we predict a pattern of offshoring and reshoring over the course of economic development. We achieve this, by extending Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg's (2008) model of offshoring in a simple way by assuming that offshoring requires both workers and capital in the offshored country. As a consequence, the accumulation of capital in the offshored country has two opposing effects on offshoring. On the one hand, it increases the wage rate of workers rendering offshoring less attractive. On the other hand, it decreases the rental price of capital rendering offshoring more attractive. Putting these two effects together, we analytically generate the inverted-U pattern of offshoring recently observed in China.Type:discussion paperIssue:1309 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, From China with love: Effects of the Chinese economy on skill-biased technical change in the USIn this study, we analyze the effects of a decrease in unskilled labor in China on the direction of innovation in the US by incorporating production o¤shoring into a North-South model of directed technical change. We find that if offshoring is present (absent) in equilibrium, then a decrease in unskilled labor in the South would lead to skill-biased (unskill-biased) technical change in the North. This finding highlights the different implications of o¤shoring and conventional trade on innovation. Furthermore, we find that an increase in the Southern stock of capital reduces offshoring and also leads to skill-biased technical change. Therefore, rapid capital accumulation and a decrease in unskilled labor in China could both lead to a rising skill premium in the US. Calibrating the model to China-US data, we find that a 1% decrease in unskilled labor (1% increase in capital) in China leads to a 0.8% (0.6%) increase in the skill premium in the US under a moderate elasticity of substitution between skill-intensive and labor-intensive goods.Type:discussion paperIssue:44576 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Innovating Like China: a Theory of Stage-Dependent Intellectual Property Rights(2012); - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Innovation-Specific Patent ProtectionThis study develops an R&D-based growth model that features both vertical and horizontal innovation to shed some light on the current debate on whether patent protection stimulates or sti?es innovation. Specifcally, we analyze the growth and welfare effects of patent protection in the form of profit division between sequential innovators along the quality ladder. We show that patent protection has asymmetric effects on vertical innovation (i.e., quality improvement) and horizontal innovation (i.e., variety expansion). Maximizing the incentives for vertical (horizontal) innovation requires a profit-division rule that assigns the entire flow profit to the entrant (incumbent) of a quality ladder. In light of this finding, we argue that in order to properly analyze the growth and welfare implications of patent protection, it is important to firstly disentangle its different effects on vertical and horizontal innovation.Type:working paperIssue:09-A010