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Manfred Gärtner
Former Member
Title
Prof. em. Dr.
Last Name
Gärtner
First name
Manfred
Now showing
1 - 10 of 16
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PublicationType: journal articleJournal: WirtschaftsdienstVolume: 92Issue: 2
Scopus© Citations 1 -
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Publication
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PublicationDer Ausverkauf deutscher Steuersouveränität : Diskussionsbeitrag zur Frage 'Kann das Steuerabkommen zwischen Deutschland und der Schweiz zu grösserer Steuergerechtigkeit führen?(ifo Institut - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München, 2012-10-01)
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PublicationCan tax evasion tame Leviathan governments?This paper looks at how income tax rates, consumption and public spending respond as venues for tax evasion open or close. The analysis draws on a 16-generation OLG model in which tax rates are determined in a repeated game between voters and a rent-seeking Leviathan government. Key insights are: (1) Effects on any generation alive when change takes place may differ substantially from steady state effects that accrue for generations yet to be born. (2) There is considerable intergenerational diversity in these effects that is not monotonous as we move from young to old. Combined, these results suggest that the political economy of pertinent institutional change may be quite complex. [http://www.vwa.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/dp2006/DP19_Ga.pdf Download full text]Type: discussion paperIssue: 19-2006
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PublicationMacroeconomic effects of bank secrecy when tax evasion is endogenousWe analyze a multi-country model in which a small group of countries adopts banking secrecy (BS) laws and a withholding tax. The other group doesn't. BS countries benefit in all relevant macroeconomic variables, including taxes and the provision of public goods. In non- BS countries most of the same variables deteriorate - when tax evasion is exogenous or its tax elasticity is moderate. When this elasticity is high, BS may drive these countries' tax rates down also, and income, consumption and wealth may rise. However, public-goods provision always deteriorates and welfare falls. We also argue that this case does not appear to be relevant empirically. [http://www.vwa.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/dp2006/DP10_ga.pdf Download full text]Type: discussion paperIssue: 10-2006
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PublicationType: discussion paperIssue: 20-2006
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PublicationWelfare and distribution effects of bank secrecy laws( 2005-03-01)
;Brevik, FrodeWe analyze an overlapping-generations world comprising two groups of small countries whose preferences for public spending differ. Key steady-state effects from introducing bank secrecy and a withholding tax in countries with low government spending are: a reduction of global capital and income, a shift of wealth towards bank-secrecy countries, and falling consumption, welfare and government spending despite rising tax rates in the rest of the world. Qualitative results are robust to changes in tax-payer honesty, the Leviathan effect (permitting governments to drive public spending higher than citizens prefer), and the fraction of withholding taxes repatriated to countries of residence. -
PublicationType: newspaper articleJournal: Nürnberger ZeitungVolume: 105Issue: nicht bekannt