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Stefan Bühler
Title
Prof. Dr.
Last Name
Bühler
First name
Stefan
Email
stefan.buehler@unisg.ch
ORCID
Phone
+41 71 224 2303
Homepage
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1 - 10 of 11
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PublicationIntimidating Competitors : Endogenous Vertical Integration and Downstream Investment in Successive OligopolyThis paper examines the interplay of endogenous vertical integration and cost-reducing downstream investment in successive oligopoly. Analyzing a linear Cournot model, we establish the following key results: (i) Vertical integration increases own investment and decreases competitor investment (intimidation effect). (ii) Asymmetric integration is a non-degenerate equilibrium outcome. (iii) Compared to a benchmark model without investment, complete vertical separation is a less likely outcome. We argue that these findings generalize beyond the linear Cournot model under reasonable assumptions.Type: journal articleJournal: International Journal of Industrial OrganizationVolume: 26Issue: 1
Scopus© Citations 30 -
PublicationAsymmetric Vertical IntegrationWe examine vertical backward integration in a reduced-form model of successive oligopolies. Our key findings are: (i) There may be asymmetric equilibria where some firms integrate and others remain separated, even if firms are symmetric initially; (ii) Efficient firms are more likely to integrate vertically. As a result, integrated firms also tend to have a large market share. The driving force behind these findings are demand/mark-up complementarities in the product market. We also identify countervailing forces resulting from strong vertical foreclosure, upstream sales and endogenous acquisition costs.Type: journal articleJournal: Advances in Theoretical EconomicsVolume: 5Issue: 1
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PublicationInfrastructure Quality in Deregulated Industries: Is There an Underinvestment Problem?We investigate how various institutional settings affect a network provider's incentives to invest in infrastructure quality. Under reasonable assumptions on demand, investment incentives turn out to be smaller under vertical separation than under vertical integration, though we also provide counterexamples. The introduction of downstream competition for the market can sometimes improve incentives. With suitable non-linear access prices investment incentives under separation become identical to those under integration.Type: journal articleJournal: International Journal of Industrial OrganizationVolume: 22Issue: 2
Scopus© Citations 46 -
PublicationRailway Reforms in Europe - A Lost Cause?( 2002-03-01)Schmutzler, ArminType: conference paper
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PublicationBahnreform und Netzqualität: ein inhärenter Widerspruch?(Institut für Öffentliche Dienstleistungen und Tourismus, 2001)
;Schmutzler, Armin ;Claude, KasparType: book section -
PublicationType: newspaper articleJournal: Neue Zürcher Zeitung NZZVolume: 224Issue: 224
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PublicationAnalyzing Mergers under Asymmetric Information : A Simple Reduced-Form Approach(University of St. Gallen, Department of Economics Working Paper 2008-15, 2008)
;Schmutzler, ArminBorek, ThomasThis paper provides a simple reduced-form framework for analyzing merger decisions in the presence of asymmetric information about firm types, building on Shapiro's (1986) oligopoly model with asymmetric information about marginal costs. We employ this framework to examine what types of firms are likely to be involved in mergers. While we give sufficient conditions under which only lowtype firms merge, as a lemons rationale would suggest, we also argue that these conditions will often be violated in practice. Finally, our analysis shows how signaling considerations a¤ect merger decisions.Type: working paper -
PublicationIntimidating Competitors ? Asymmetric Vertical Integration and Downstream Investment in Oligopoly( 2004)Schmutzler, Armin
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PublicationWeddings with Uncertain Prospects ? Mergers under Asymmetric Information( 2003)
;Borek, ThomasSchmutzler, ArminType: working paper