The State's Enforcement Monopoly and the Private Protection of Property
Journal
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)
ISSN
0932-4569
ISSN-Digital
1614-0559
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2014-03-01
Author(s)
Grechenig, Kristoffel
Abstract
The modern state has monopolized the legitimate use of force. This concept is twofold. First, the state is empowered with enforcement rights; second, the rights of the individuals are restricted. In a simple model of property rights with appropriation and defense activity, we show that a restriction of private enforcement is beneficial for the property owner, even if there are no economies of scale from public protection. We emphasize the role of the state as a commitment device for a certain level of enforcement. However, commitment will only work if the state can regulate private protection, such as private armies and mercenaries.
Language
English
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
Mohr
Publisher place
Tübingen
Volume
170
Number
1
Start page
5
End page
23
Pages
19
Subject(s)
Eprints ID
235052