Round-Robin Tournaments with a Dominant Player
Journal
The Scandinavian journal of economics
ISSN
0347-0520
ISSN-Digital
1467-9442
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2016-10
Author(s)
Abstract
We analyze the subgame perfect equilibrium of the round‐robin tournament with one strong (dominant) and two weak players, and we compare this tournament and the one‐stage contest with respect to the players' expected payoffs, expected total effort, and their probabilities of winning. We find that if the contest designer's goal is to maximize the players' expected total effort, then – if the asymmetry between the players is relatively low – the one‐stage contest should be used. However, if the asymmetry is relatively high, then the round‐robin tournament should be used.
Language
English
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
Refereed
No
Publisher
Wiley-Blackwell
Publisher place
Oxford
Volume
119
Number
4
Start page
1167
End page
1200
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
245920