Group size and group success in conflicts
Journal
Social Choice and Welfare
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2020-06-04
Author(s)
Abstract (De)
This paper analyzes the occurrence of the group-size paradox in situations in which groups compete for rents, allowing for degrees of rivalry of the rent among group members. We provide two intuitive criteria for the group-impact function which for groups with within-group symmetric valuations of the rent determine whether there are advantages or disadvantages for larger groups: social-interactions effects and returns to scale. For groups with within-group asymmetric valuations, the complementarity of group members’ efforts and the composition of valuations are shown to play a role as further factors.
Language
English
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
HSG Profile Area
SEPS - Economic Policy
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
Springer
Number
55
Start page
777
End page
822
Subject(s)
Eprints ID
262181