Collective self-deception about political reality

In philosophical epistemology, the concept of self-deception denotes problematic instances in the individual’s balancing of reasons. Someone is self-deceived if they hold on to a belief de-spite strong evidence against it. Political theory generally understands politics as public delib-eration and involving collectively binding decision-making. This perspective assumes that col-lectives know what is necessary or best. Yet, it is becoming harder to know the relevant facts and begin disentangling the set-up of our political reality. We can be mistaken or wrong about our basic assumptions. Political reality is not only characterized by being right, but also by being mistaken, wrong or self-deceived about facts, the causes of particular problems, and possible outcomes of decisions.
This paper contributes to our philosophical and (political-)theoretical understanding of politi-cal reality in three moves. First, I introduce the concept of collective self-deception (CSD), distinct from individual self-deception and other forms of deceiving others. I define CSD as systematic misinterpretation by a social group, which holds certain beliefs, over the course of decision-making despite better knowledge and evidence to the contrary. Second, I distinguish between the more comprehensive concept of ideology and CSD, which is neither ‘thick’ nor ‘sticky’. CSD can arise in particular situations and due to shifts in discourse. Third, I explore the analytical value of CSD by drawing on examples from three recent political events: the 2016 EU referendum in the UK and the consequent decision to ‘Brexit’, the 2016 election of Donald Trump in the US, and the ongoing climate change denialist campaigns.