Martin Kolmar
Title
Prof. Dr.
Last Name
Kolmar
First name
Martin
Email
martin.kolmar@unisg.ch
Phone
+41 71 224 2535
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Item type:Veröffentlichung, Tolerierbarer Rechtsbruch in der Klimakrise?(2021-06-19); cris-layout.advanced-attachment.dc.type:journal articleJournal:Neue Zürcher Zeitung - third-party-metrics-blockedthird-party-metrics-cookies.consent-settings
Item type:Veröffentlichung, Group size and group success in conflictscris-layout.advanced-attachment.dc.type:journal articleJournal:Social Choice and WelfareIssue:55metric-badges.scopusCitation 3 - third-party-metrics-blockedthird-party-metrics-cookies.consent-settings
Item type:Veröffentlichung, Group Identities in Conflictscris-layout.advanced-attachment.dc.type:journal articleJournal:Homo oeconomicus - third-party-metrics-blockedthird-party-metrics-cookies.consent-settings
Item type:Veröffentlichung, «Wettbewerbsverzerrung» und «Grundsatz der Wirtschaftsfreiheit»(2018); cris-layout.advanced-attachment.dc.type:journal articleJournal:Schweizerisches Zentralblatt für Staats- und VerwaltungsrechtVolume:119 - third-party-metrics-blockedthird-party-metrics-cookies.consent-settings
Item type:Veröffentlichung, Distributional preferences in probabilistic and share contestscris-layout.advanced-attachment.dc.type:journal articleJournal:Journal of economic behavior & organizationVolume:142metric-badges.scopusCitation 5 - third-party-metrics-blockedthird-party-metrics-cookies.consent-settings
Item type:Veröffentlichung, Locating Ordonomicscris-layout.advanced-attachment.dc.type:journal articleJournal:Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und UnternehmensethikVolume:17Issue:3 - third-party-metrics-blockedthird-party-metrics-cookies.consent-settings
Item type:Veröffentlichung, Locating Responsibility. An Extended Transaction Cost Approachcris-layout.advanced-attachment.dc.type:journal articleJournal:Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und UnternehmensethikVolume:17Issue:1 - third-party-metrics-blockedthird-party-metrics-cookies.consent-settings
Item type:Veröffentlichung, Costly Exclusion, Property-Rights Enforcement, and the Optimal Supply of Rival and Non-Rival GoodsWe analyze the optimal relationship between the public and private enforcement of property rights for the case of rival and nonrival goods. Exclusion is interpreted as a costly activity, which allows it to endogenize the distinctions between public and club goods on the one hand and between private and common-pool goods on the other. We characterize optimality conditions for the private provision of rival and nonrival goods, characterize optimal enforcement policies, and compare the solutions with other institutional alternatives.cris-layout.advanced-attachment.dc.type:journal articleJournal:Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)Volume:171Issue:3metric-badges.scopusCitation 1 - third-party-metrics-blockedthird-party-metrics-cookies.consent-settings
Item type:Veröffentlichung, Die Ökonomik und ihre Schwierigkeiten mit der Moralcris-layout.advanced-attachment.dc.type:journal articleJournal:Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und UnternehmensethikVolume:16Issue:3 - third-party-metrics-blockedthird-party-metrics-cookies.consent-settings
Item type:Veröffentlichung, The State's Enforcement Monopoly and the Private Protection of PropertyThe modern state has monopolized the legitimate use of force. This concept is twofold. First, the state is empowered with enforcement rights; second, the rights of the individuals are restricted. In a simple model of property rights with appropriation and defense activity, we show that a restriction of private enforcement is beneficial for the property owner, even if there are no economies of scale from public protection. We emphasize the role of the state as a commitment device for a certain level of enforcement. However, commitment will only work if the state can regulate private protection, such as private armies and mercenaries.cris-layout.advanced-attachment.dc.type:journal articleJournal:Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)Volume:170Issue:1