R&D Cooperation and Growth
Journal
Journal of Economic Theory
Type
journal article
Date Issued
1999-04
Author(s)
Abstract
If R&D produces nonrival inputs then firms have an incentive to cooperate, but free riding can make cooperation difficult. This paper builds a simple endogenous growth model allowing cooperative behavior among firms in their R&D game. Industry's first best cooperative investment is enforceable as an equilibrium only if technology is above a threshold level. This model allows for switching equilibria able to sustain slower growth in poorer countries. The model also admits sunspot equilibria. In a world where the production of ideas is important multiplicity and variability of economic performance can be relevant.
Language
English
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
HSG Profile Area
SEPS - Economic Policy
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
Elsevier
Volume
86
Number
1
Start page
17
End page
49
Pages
33
Subject(s)
Eprints ID
222087