Potential, Prizes and Performance:Testing Tournament Theory with Professional Tennis Data
Series
IZA - Discussion papers
Type
discussion paper
Date Issued
2003-12-01
Author(s)
Sunde, Uwe
Abstract
This paper tests two hypotheses from the theory of elimination tournaments: (i) that uneven tournaments, where the contestants are ex ante heterogeneous, entail lower effort exertion; this is a prediction from agency theory that has not been tested empirically before; and (ii) whether incentives set through prizes matter for effort exertion; this assumption underlies any agency theory about elimination tournaments, and has been empirically tested in other contexts. The evidence obtained with data from professional tennis tournaments supports both the assumption that incentives matter, as well as the theoretical implications concerning uneven tournaments among heterogeneous contestants.
Language
English
Keywords
elimination tournaments
uneven tournaments
incentives in tournaments
tennis
HSG Classification
contribution to practical use / society
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
mimeo
Number
947
Start page
1
End page
32
Pages
32
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
71601