Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms
Journal
Human Nature
ISSN
1045-6767
ISSN-Digital
1936-4776
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2002-03-01
Author(s)
Fehr, Ernst
;
Fischbacher, Urs
;
Gaechter, Simon
Abstract
This paper provides strong evidence challenging the self-interest assumption that dominates the behavioral sciences and much evolutionary thinking. The evidence indicates that many people have a tendency to voluntarily cooperate, if treated fairly, and to punish noncooperators. We call this behavioral propensity "strong reciprocity" and show empirically that it can lead to almost universal cooperation in circumstances in which purely self-interested behavior would cause a complete breakdown of cooperation. In addition, we show that people are willing to punish those who behaved unfairly towards a third person or who defected in a Prisoner's Dilemma game with a third person. This suggests that strong reciprocity is a powerful device for the enforcement of social norms involving, for example, food sharing or collective action. Strong reciprocity cannot be rationalized as an adaptive trait by the leading evolutionary theories of human cooperation (in other words, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, and costly signaling theory). However, multilevel selection theories of cultural evolution are consistent with strong reciprocity.
Language
English
Keywords
Evolution
Game theory
Human cooperation
Punishment
Social norms
Strong reciprocity
HSG Classification
not classified
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
de Gruyter
Publisher place
Hawthorne, NY
Volume
13
Number
1
Start page
1
End page
25
Pages
25
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
10379