The WTO Dispute Settlement System: A First Assessment from an Economic Perspective
Journal
Journal of Law, Economics & Organization
ISSN
8756-6222
ISSN-Digital
1465-7341
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2000-10-01
Author(s)
Abstract
We explore the incentives countries face in trade litigation within the new WTO Dispute Settlement System. Our analysis yields a number of interesting predictions. First, because sanctions are ruled out during the litigation process, the Dispute Settlement System does not preclude all new trade restrictions. However, the agenda-setting capacity of the complainant, including its right to force a decision, make traderestrictions less attractive than under the WTO's predecessor GATT. Second, the system's appellate review provides the losing defendant with strong incentives to delay negative findings, and both parties with a possibility to signal their determinacy in fighting the case. Third, a relatively weak implementation procedure potentially reinforces incentives to violate WTO trade rules. Fourth, bilateral settlements are more likely at an early stage in the process and are biased towards the expected outcome of the formal dispute settlement procedure. empirical evidence based on a first data set of cases at an advanced stage of the litigation process provides qualitative support for our claims. (pdf, 230k)
Language
English
Keywords
World Trade Organisation
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
Refereed
No
Publisher
Oxford Univ. Press
Publisher place
Cary, NC
Volume
16
Number
2
Start page
503
End page
533
Pages
31
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
16002
File(s)![Thumbnail Image]()
open.access
Name
chef-jleo.pdf
Size
229.98 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
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