Uncertainty Averse Bank Runners
Series
Working Papers
Type
working paper
Date Issued
2008
Author(s)
Abstract
Bank runs are relatively rare events characterized by highly pessimistic depositors?expectations. How would pessimistic depositors expect to be treated in a bank run? How will this a¤ect their behavior? How can banks handle this kind of risk? In the framework of a Diamond-Dybvig-Peck-Shell banking model, in which a broad class of feasible contractual arrangements (including suspension schemes) is allowed and which admits a run equilibrium, we analyze a scenario in which depositors are uncertain of their treatment should a run occur. We check whether bank runs are more likely or less likely to happen, in particular, if depositors are maxmin decision makers. We assess the utility of suspension schemes in the presence of pessimistic bank runners.
Language
English
Keywords
Uncertainty
Multi-Prior Beliefs
Suspension Schemes
Panic-Driven Bank Runs
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
HSG Profile Area
SEPS - Economic Policy
Refereed
No
Publisher
Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow
Number
2008_03
Subject(s)
Eprints ID
222156
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open.access
Name
media_66818_en.pdf
Size
114.5 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
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