Die Unabhängigkeit des Revisors
Journal
Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Finanzmarktrecht : SZW
ISSN
1018-7987
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2007
Author(s)
Druey, Jean-Nicolas
Abstract (De)
The new rules on the independence of auditors, stated essentially in art. 728 CO, follow the international tendency of being stricter and more comprehensive than their predecessors. They are composed of a general clause stating simply that the auditors have to be "independent", and a series of specific but still sweeping types of cases. Also following the trend, the new law requires the independence to be maintained not only in fact, but in the mere appearance leaving wide-open, however, what this means. By their very nature, this kind of rules can certainly not prevent all sorts of biased judgments. They are, from the outset, focused on one type of dependence being the influence resulting from specific human relationships, whereas the probably most serious source of biased opinions is the power of management to elect and to pay the auditors; this, however, is immanent in the system and the law only tackles it indirectly and exclusively for public companies by a 10%-limit of total fees per client. Even some potentially dangerous kinds of relationships are tolerated, such as working for a competitor. Consulting parallel to auditing is not prohibited in principle as long as the auditing function does not imply an evaluation of the consulting results. In the light of the remaining and considerable loopholes, two conclusions are of importance: First, the rules on incompatibility dealt with here have their compliment in the general duty of care obliging the auditor to avoid by his proper effort all circumstances which could endanger his objectivity. Second, in the interpretation of the legal previsions, proportionality with the overall chances of safeguarding independence should be observed.
Language
German
HSG Classification
not classified
Refereed
No
Publisher
Schulthess
Publisher place
Zürich
Number
6
Start page
439
End page
449
Pages
11
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
237065