Who Chooses Whom? Syndication, Skills and Reputation
Journal
Review of Financial Economics
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2007
Author(s)
Abstract
© 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. We develop a model focusing on the dynamic aspect of syndication, namely, the know-how transfer between syndication partners and their ability to learn. The core of the analysis checks whether reputational concerns outweigh the temptation to renege on a given contract. Throughout the paper, we investigate two key topics. The first consists of the conditions under which investors syndicate their deals. The second focuses on who chooses whom. Sometimes, the syndication is impeded because the financier believes that his partner has strong incentives to either renege on a contract (hold-up problem) or to shirk (moral hazard problem).
Language
English
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
HSG Profile Area
SOF - System-wide Risk in the Financial System
Refereed
Yes
Volume
16(1)
Start page
5
End page
28
Pages
23
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
259435