Coordination and Motivation in Flat Hierarchies: The Impact of the Adjudication Culture
Journal
Economica
ISSN
0013-0427
ISSN-Digital
1468-0335
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2005-11-01
Author(s)
Mohr, Ernst
;
Chakraborty, Rabindra Nath
Abstract
This paper considers a variation of the partnership game with imperfect public information, in which teams are semi-autonomous. The only hierarchical intervention in teamwork is when a superior is called in by a team member to adjudicate alleged cases of free-riding or unjustified lateral punishment (flat hierarchy) according to publicly known adjudicative rules (adjudication culture), using for statistical inference a publicly known organizational norm for teamwork cooperation. It is shown that it is advantageous to set a non-elitist organizational teamwork norm. Furthermore, fairness in adjudication is valuable for economic reasons alone.
Language
English
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
Blackwell
Publisher place
Oxford
Volume
72
Number
288
Start page
563
End page
576
Pages
14
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
40150