Beliefs, payoffs, information: On the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs
Journal
Journal of Mathematical Economics
ISSN
0304-4068
ISSN-Digital
1873-1538
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2014-03-01
Author(s)
Abstract
Neeman (2004) and Heifetz and Neeman (2006) have shown that, in auctions with incomplete information about payoffs, full surplus extraction is only possible if agents' beliefs about other agents are fully informative about their own payoff parameters. They argue that the set of incomplete-information models with common priors that satisfy this so-called BDP property ("beliefs determine preferences") is negligible. In contrast, we show that, in models with finite-dimensional abstract type spaces, the set of belief functions with this property is topologically generic in the set of all belief functions. Our result implies genericity of (non-common or common) priors with the BDP property.
Language
English
Keywords
Abstract type spaces
Mechanism design
Correlated information
Belief functions
BDP property
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
Refereed
No
Publisher
Elsevier
Publisher place
Amsterdam
Volume
51
Number
-
Start page
136
End page
153
Pages
18
Subject(s)
Eprints ID
243434