How to Mitigate Corruption in Emerging Markets: The Case of Russia
Journal
Harvard University: Edmond J. Safra Working Papers
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2014-02-07
Author(s)
Abstract
Russian CEOs are arguably the most experienced managers in the world when it comes to working in corrupt environments. For our analysis, we gathered data from the CEOs and owners of 111 local and international companies operating in Russia. We asked them to assess their experiences with informal practices, including the extent to which their businesses are dependent on informal deals and the strategies they deploy to mitigate business corruption. The list of specific practices and strategies assembled in the pilot interviews and media content analysis has been cross-checked with the existing typologies of corruption in post-communist societies and verified through in-depth interviews.
This study presents the outcomes of our analysis, one of which is that companies tend to blame officials for corrupt activities while hiding their own internal corruption from public view. Both are dependent on the industry in which they operate, however. The paper also includes the approach we developed to understand the less reprehensible but more widespread forms of corruption such as collusion, conflict of interest, cronyism and nepotism, fraud, gifts and hospitality, lobbying, abuse of power or office, and influence peddling.
This study presents the outcomes of our analysis, one of which is that companies tend to blame officials for corrupt activities while hiding their own internal corruption from public view. Both are dependent on the industry in which they operate, however. The paper also includes the approach we developed to understand the less reprehensible but more widespread forms of corruption such as collusion, conflict of interest, cronyism and nepotism, fraud, gifts and hospitality, lobbying, abuse of power or office, and influence peddling.
Language
English
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
Harvard University
Publisher place
Cambridge, MA
Number
36
Official URL
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
229195