Sequential R&D and Blocking Patents in the Dynamics of Growth
Series
Economics Working Paper Series
Type
discussion paper
Date Issued
2013-03
Author(s)
Abstract
The incentives to conduct basic or applied research play a central role for economic growth. How does increasing early innovation appropriability affect basic research, applied research, innovation and growth? In a common law system an explicitly dynamic macroeconomic analysis is appropriate. This paper analyzes the macroeconomic effects of patent protection by incorporating a twostage cumulative innovation structure into a quality-ladder growth model with skill acquisition. We focus on two issues: (a) the over-protection vs. the under-protection of intellectual property rights in basic research; (b) the evolution of jurisprudence shaping the bargaining power of the upstream innovators. We show that the dynamic general equilibrium interactions may seriously mislead the empirical assessment of the growth effects of IPR policy: stronger protection of upstream innovation always looks bad in the short- and possibly medium-run. We also provide a simple "rule of thumb" indicator of the basic researcher bargaining power.
Language
English
Keywords
Endogenous Growth
Basic and Applied Research
Endogenous Technological Change
Common Law.
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
HSG Profile Area
SEPS - Economic Policy
Refereed
No
Publisher
University of St.Gallen
Publisher place
St. Gallen
Number
1305
Start page
53
Subject(s)
Eprints ID
221855
File(s)![Thumbnail Image]()
open.access
Name
EWP-1305.pdf
Size
618.94 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
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