Governance, Bureaucratic Rents and Well-Being Differentials Across US States
Journal
Oxford Economic Papers
ISSN
0030-7653
ISSN-Digital
1464-3812
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2013-02-21
Author(s)
Abstract
We analyse the influence of institutional restrictions on bureaucratic rents. As a measure for these rents, we propose subjective well-being differentials between workers in the public administration and workers in other industries. Based on data for the US states, we estimate the extent to which institutional efforts to strengthen bureaucratic accountability affect differences in well-being. We find that well-being differences are smaller in states with high transparency, elected auditors, and legal deficit carryover restrictions. These findings are consistent with limited rent extraction under these institutional conditions. No or weak effects are found for performance audits and regulatory review.
Language
English
Keywords
bureaucracy
balanced-budget rules
public auditors
public administration
regulatory review
rent-seeking
subjective well-being
transparency
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
HSG Profile Area
SEPS - Economic Policy
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
Oxford Univ. Press
Publisher place
Oxford UK
Volume
66
Number
2
Start page
443
End page
464
Pages
22
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
220857