Electoral Terms and Terrorism
Journal
Public Choice
ISSN
0048-5829
ISSN-Digital
1573-7101
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2012-01-01
Author(s)
Abstract (De)
Many terror attacks occur at the beginning of electoral terms. We present a game theoretical model with incomplete information to account for this empirical pattern. Both terrorists and governments can be of weak or strong types. We find that the risk of terror attacks is highest at the beginning of electoral terms, because striking early allows the terrorists to collect valuable information about the government's type, and also because terrorists know that even initially weak governments sometimes retaliate to show toughness closer to an upcoming election. The model's predictions are consistent with anecdotal evidence.
Language
German
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
Springer
Publisher place
Dordrecht
Volume
150
Number
1-2
Start page
181
End page
193
Pages
13
Subject(s)
Eprints ID
234971