Do independant prosecutors deter political corruption? : An Empirical Evaluation across Seventy-eight Countries
Journal
American Law and Economics Review
ISSN
1465-7252
ISSN-Digital
1465-7260
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2010-04-12
Author(s)
Abstract
It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members that in turn increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular kind of crime, namely corruption. In order to test it, it was necessary to create an indicator measuring de jure as well as de facto independence of the prosecution agencies. The regressions show that de facto independence of prosecution agencies robustly reduces corruption of officials.
Language
English
HSG Classification
contribution to education
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
Oxford Journals
Publisher place
Oxford
Volume
12
Number
1
Start page
204
End page
244
Pages
41
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
61716