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Makroökonomische Implikationen von Bankgeheimnis und Verrechnungssteuer
Type
fundamental research project
Start Date
01 January 2004
End Date
01 May 2006
Status
ongoing
Keywords
Bankgeheimnis
Verrechnungssteuer
Kapitalflucht
Kapitalbildung
Staatsquote
Zinsbesteuerung
Leader contributor(s)
Member contributor(s)
Brevik, Frode
Funder(s)
Range
Institute/School
Range (De)
Institut/School
Division(s)
Eprints ID
10686
16 results
Now showing
1 - 10 of 16
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PublicationType: presentation
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PublicationType: discussion paperIssue: 20-2006
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Publication
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PublicationType: newspaper articleJournal: Nürnberger ZeitungVolume: 105Issue: nicht bekannt
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PublicationMacroeconomic effects of bank secrecy when tax evasion is endogenousWe analyze a multi-country model in which a small group of countries adopts banking secrecy (BS) laws and a withholding tax. The other group doesn't. BS countries benefit in all relevant macroeconomic variables, including taxes and the provision of public goods. In non- BS countries most of the same variables deteriorate - when tax evasion is exogenous or its tax elasticity is moderate. When this elasticity is high, BS may drive these countries' tax rates down also, and income, consumption and wealth may rise. However, public-goods provision always deteriorates and welfare falls. We also argue that this case does not appear to be relevant empirically. [http://www.vwa.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/dp2006/DP10_ga.pdf Download full text]Type: discussion paperIssue: 10-2006
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PublicationType: newspaper articleJournal: St. Galler TagblattIssue: nicht bekannt
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PublicationCan tax evasion tame Leviathan governments?This paper looks at how income tax rates, consumption and public spending respond as venues for tax evasion open or close. The analysis draws on a 16-generation OLG model in which tax rates are determined in a repeated game between voters and a rent-seeking Leviathan government. Key insights are: (1) Effects on any generation alive when change takes place may differ substantially from steady state effects that accrue for generations yet to be born. (2) There is considerable intergenerational diversity in these effects that is not monotonous as we move from young to old. Combined, these results suggest that the political economy of pertinent institutional change may be quite complex. [http://www.vwa.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/dp2006/DP19_Ga.pdf Download full text]Type: discussion paperIssue: 19-2006