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Monika Bütler
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Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c.
Last Name
Bütler
First name
Monika
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+41 71 224 23 17
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@MonikaBuetler
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PublicationEconomists: moral realists or real moralists? Comment on Fourcade and BrunettiA comparative sociologist who has spent her international career in academia—Marion Fourcade—and a practically minded academic economist with an extended stint in the Swiss government—Aymo Brunetti—offer their views on the role of economists in politics and society. Although Fourcade and Brunetti differ a lot in terms of experience and interest, their insightful and nuanced assessments of economics today are often remarkably similar. Marion Fourcade addresses economists with the Japanese attitude of a 30-degree bow. She modestly calls her views “from below” and she refrains from throwing the gauntlet to the economics profession, as many representatives of social sciences have done in the past. That does not mean she turns a blind eye on some weaknesses of our field. Yet, she portraits problematic issues as interesting aspects of economics. Her text is a pleasure to read because it is an invitation to think about our field, rather than a challenge to a duel.Type: journal articleJournal: Swiss Journal of Economics and StatisticsVolume: 154Issue: 1
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PublicationType: journal articleJournal: Journal of Pension Economics and FinanceVolume: 16Issue: 4
Scopus© Citations 17 -
PublicationFinancial work incentives for disability benefit recipients: lessons from a randomised field experiment(Springer Open, 2015-09)
;Staubli, StefanDisability insurance (DI) beneficiaries lose part or all of their benefits if earnings exceed certain thresholds (“cash-cliffs”). This implicit taxation is considered the prime reason for the low number of beneficiaries who expand work and reduce benefit receipt. We analyse a conditional cash programme that incentivises work related reductions of disability benefits in Switzerland. Four thousand DI beneficiaries received an offer to claim up to CHF 72,000 (USD 77,000) if they expand work and reduce benefits. Initial reactions to the programme announcement, measured by call-back rates, are modest. By the end of the field phase, the take-up rate is only 0.5 %.Type: journal articleJournal: IZA Journal of Labor PolicyVolume: 4Issue: 18Scopus© Citations 15 -
PublicationType: journal articleJournal: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik (PWP)Volume: 8Issue: 1
Scopus© Citations 4 -
PublicationThe WTO Dispute Settlement System: A First Assessment from an Economic PerspectiveWe explore the incentives countries face in trade litigation within the new WTO Dispute Settlement System. Our analysis yields a number of interesting predictions. First, because sanctions are ruled out during the litigation process, the Dispute Settlement System does not preclude all new trade restrictions. However, the agenda-setting capacity of the complainant, including its right to force a decision, make traderestrictions less attractive than under the WTO's predecessor GATT. Second, the system's appellate review provides the losing defendant with strong incentives to delay negative findings, and both parties with a possibility to signal their determinacy in fighting the case. Third, a relatively weak implementation procedure potentially reinforces incentives to violate WTO trade rules. Fourth, bilateral settlements are more likely at an early stage in the process and are biased towards the expected outcome of the formal dispute settlement procedure. empirical evidence based on a first data set of cases at an advanced stage of the litigation process provides qualitative support for our claims. (pdf, 230k)Type: journal articleJournal: Journal of Law, Economics & OrganizationVolume: 16Issue: 2
Scopus© Citations 35 -
PublicationFinancial work incentives for disability benefit recipients: Lessons from a randomized field experiment(University of St. Gallen Department of Economics Working Paper Series, 2014-02)
;Staubli, StefanDisability insurance (DI) beneficiaries lose some of their benefits if their earnings exceed certain thresholds (“cash-cliffs”). When this reduction is too high, this implicit taxation of earnings is considered to be one of the prime reasons for the low outflow from DI. This paper analyzes a conditional cash program that incentivizes work related reductions of disability benefits in Switzerland. A randomized group of DI beneficiaries receive the offer to claim a payment of up to CHF 72,000 (USD 71,000) if they take up or expand employment and reduce DI claims. This paper presents the results of the short-term evaluation by analyzing the first reactions to the announcement of seed capital. Overall, the interest in taking-up the financial incentive is low at only 3%. Individuals close to cash-cliffs react more on seed capital but the overall magnitude is small. Our results suggest that work-disincentives imposed by cash-cliffs are unlikely to be the main driver for low employment and outflow from the Swiss disability insurance system, despite the fact that the partial disability insurance system generates a non-linear budget set and bunching behavior at cash-cliffs prior to the implementation of seed capital.Type: discussion paperIssue: 2014-06Scopus© Citations 15 -
PublicationThe WTO Dispute Settlement System: A First Assessment from an Economic Perspective( 2000-01-01)We explore the incentives countries face in trade litigation within the new WTO Dispute Settlement System. Our analysis yields a number of interesting predictions. First, because sanctions are ruled out during the litigation process, the Dispute Settlement System does not preclude all new trade restrictions. However, the agenda-setting capacity of the complainant, including its right to force a decision, make traderestrictions less attractive than under the WTO's predecessor GATT. Second, the system's appellate review provides the losing defendant with strong incentives to delay negative findings, and both parties with a possibility to signal their determinacy in fighting the case. Third, a relatively weak implementation procedure potentially reinforces incentives to violate WTO trade rules. Fourth, bilateral settlements are more likely at an early stage in the process and are biased towards the expected outcome of the formal dispute settlement procedure. empirical evidence based on a first data set of cases at an advanced stage of the litigation process provides qualitative support for our claims.Type: discussion paperIssue: Discussion Paper Nr. 2000-21
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PublicationThe WTO Dispute Settlement System: Playing the Game( 1998-01-01)This paper analyzes the new World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system as a dynamic game under uncertainty, and explores its strategic elements and incentive structure. Our model delivers a number of implications, confirmed by already settled cases: Governments are often tempted to introduce trade restrictions which can guar- antee a positive payoff for a certain period of time. The complainant's agenda{setting capacity, nevertheless, can enhance economic efficiency by limiting the period in which trade restrictions are active. The losing party has a strong incentive to appeal the first instance findings of the procedure. Bilateral settlements can become feasible at different intermediate stages of the process. (pdf, 311k)Type: discussion paperIssue: no. 9801
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PublicationType: newspaper articleJournal: NZZ am Sonntag
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